Insights into Differences in Response of the USAand the EUROArea to the Recent Crisis by Hosoff, Boris & Sikulova, Ivana
European Scientific Journal January 2017 /SPECIAL/ edition   ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
74 
Insights into Differences in Response of the USA and the 




Boris Hosoff, PhD 
Ivana Sikulova, PhD 




 The recent financial crisis followed by recession has strongly hit the 
economies of the USA and euro area. However, their fiscal policy tools 
available differ significantly, hence also the response of fiscal authorities of 
both monetary unions to the crisis. On the other hand, in the field of 
monetary policy, rather similar tools have been used, although with different 
timing and results so far. The aim of the paper is to underline the main 
differences and common features of the institutional response to the crisis in 
the USA and euro area, to compare the developments of selected 
macroeconomic indicators in the period 2007 – 2015 and formulate 
conclusions for both monetary unions. The first part of the paper deals with 
the response of the US Federal Reserve System (Fed) and the European 
Central Bank (ECB) to the recent crisis. In the second part, the focus is on 
different possibilities of fiscal policy response in both monetary unions – the 
USA as a fiscal union and the euro area as a monetary union without a fiscal 
union. In the third part, developments of selected macroeconomic indicators 
since the start of the crisis are analysed, namely economic growth, 
unemployment rate and general government gross debt. The key outcomes 
are summarized in conclusion.
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Introduction 
 The reaction of responsible institutions to the recent financial crisis is 
unparalleled in US post-war history and sixteen years of the euro area’s 
existence, both in terms of the need to act against all of its diverse forms 
(mortgage, credit, banking, debt crisis, crisis of demand, etc.) as well as in 
terms of the scope and the intensity of adopted monetary and fiscal 
measures.  
 When looking for reasons of different macroeconomic developments 
in the USA and euro area since the start of the crisis, a number of structural 
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differences need to be taken into account. They include the existence of a 
functional fiscal union in the USA in contrast to the euro area, level of labour 
market flexibility as well as the status of the USD as the main reserve 
currency. In this paper, the focus will be particularly on parameters of 
policies conducted by central banks (Fed, ECB) and responsible fiscal 
authorities. The aim of the paper is to underline the main differences and 
common features of the institutional response to the crisis in the USA and 
euro area, to compare the developments of selected macroeconomic 
indicators in the period 2007 – 2015 and formulate conclusions for both 
monetary unions.  
 
Response of monetary authorities 
 In the light of the debt crisis and the need for fiscal consolidation in 
advanced economies, monetary policy has become the main instrument for 
the support of aggregate demand and the re-start of business cycle expansion. 
Cukierman (2016) introduced several reasons for the differences in monetary 
policy instruments used in both monetary unions and their various effects. 
The first is a relatively greater caution and conservatism of the ECB 
compared with the Fed, as evidenced by the different intensity of quantitative 
easing (QE) policy implemented by these two institutions. In the period 
2008-2012 the balance sheets of the two central banks have developed 
similarly. However, since the second half of 2012 further monetary 
expansion has been carried on only by the Fed, while the assets of the ECB 
have begun declining sharply. Reversal occurred only after launching the QE 
programme in 2015.14 
 The second difference is that the share of banks on total lending is 
greater in the euro area than in the USA, due to more developed capital 
markets in the USA compared with continental Europe. This is also why the 
structure of monetary operations varied between the ECB and Fed. While the 
former provided necessary liquidity to banks through REPO transactions, the 
operations of the latter were primarily carried through direct purchases of 
securities. Monetary base and money supply in the euro area were more 
sensitive to short-term fluctuations in demand for liquidity by banks, while in 
                                                          
14 The ECB launched the QE programme in March 2015, with asset purchase plan of 60 
billion euros a month, at least until September 2016 and in any case until the ECB sees a 
sustained adjustment in the path of inflation that is consistent with its aim of achieving 
inflation rates below, but close to, 2% over the medium term. In December 2015, the ECB 
extended the asset purchase programme until the end of March 2017 and in March 2016 the 
monthly amount of purchases was increased to 80 billion euros, which means more than 
1700 billion euros for the whole period. For comparison, during implementation of the QE 
programme in the USA (November 2008 – November 2014), the Fed pumped into the 
economy more money than the ECB. Total assets of all Federal Reserve Banks increased 
from 2074 billion to 4486 billion USD during this period. 
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the USA monetary base was essentially influenced by decisions and policies 
conducted by the central bank. Hence, Fed’s policy could be more efficient 
in terms of achieving defined objectives (full employment, price stability), 
which was also reflected in higher growth of asset prices.   
 At the first glance, it is obvious that the USA have achieved better 
results in parameters of GDP growth, inflation and unemployment, but as 
more detailed analysis shows, the results of implemented macroeconomic 
policies are not so straightforward. In the euro area, the current development 
does not suggest that extremely expansionary monetary policy (with a 
minimum space for further loosening available) could be successful without 
increased efforts of the Member States governments. The character of the 
ECB’s monetary policy intensifies risks for future developments, whether it 
is risk of creating price bubbles or dependence on the QE policy, timing of 
finishing the programme and its consequences. 
 An interesting phenomenon of the recent crisis is the fact that 
virtually all advanced economies were negatively affected by increased 
deflationary pressures. The trend of decreasing inflation could be seen in the 
USA already since the eighties of the last century. However, since 2012 the 
US inflation is below its historical average (Figure 1), despite unprecedented 
monetary expansion. In 2015 even deflation was recorded, which occurred 
only shortly after the recession in 2009. This could indicate that the Fed’s 
policy may not be so effective and the US economy could be closer to the 
recession than it might seem. The euro area was also confronted with the 
problem of deflation in 2009, although to a lesser extent than the USA, and 
the ECB is fighting this negative phenomenon again since the end of 2014. 
F i g u r e  1  
US Fed funds rates and ECB‘s key interest rates, inflation rates in the USA and euro 
area (%) 
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 Already for a long time, deflation is a relevant problem in the 
Japanese economy. Although in the USA and euro area deflation is present 
for a relatively short period, it can pose a serious risk. The US and euro area 
authorities are well aware of this and therefore they have implemented 
unprecedented monetary expansion, leaving interest rates at historically low 
levels near zero or even at the zero level (USA for the eight consecutive 
year, euro area for the last three years) (Figure 1).   
 
Response of fiscal authorities 
 Regardless of the economic development, expenditures of the US 
federal budget amounted around 19% of GDP for most of the 1985-2007 
period. However, the scope and intensity of the Great Recession required 
unprecedented government intervention (banks bailouts, social transfers), 
increasing the share of federal budget expenditures up to 24.4 % of GDP in 
2009 (White House, 2016). 
 An important parameter of the debt crisis, which highlights the nature 
of fiscal union in the USA, is the increase in transfer payments from the 
federal level down to the national and local governments. At the state and 
local governments’ level, requirement for balanced budgets (in the light of 
falling tax revenues and rising expenditures) was compensated by an 
increase in transfer aid from the federal level. In term of the debt crisis’ 
negative impact on the budgets of the euro area Member States, there are 
obvious positive effects from the existence of fiscal union in the USA. In 
contrast to the euro area, the USA could afford record growth of spending at 
the federal level, enabling effective compensation for the negative impact the 
debt crisis had on the aggregate demand. 
 Integral part of this process was postponement of enforcement or 
direct increases of limits for the amount of federal debt. Such action has 
taken place eleven times since 2007. Historically nothing exceptional, since 
after the end of World War II this happened more than ninety times. In the 
USA, the process of determining the debt limit is separated from the creation 
of the federal budget and therefore the limit does not restrict the 
government´s ability to operate with budget deficits or under new 
commitments (White House, 2016). Increased deficits and higher debt limits 
are natural consequence of weaker economic activity and the loss of tax 
revenues as well as of the growth of expenditures due to financial crisis’ 
negative consequences.  
 Expansionary fiscal policy at the federal level has played an 
important role when offsetting the effects that crisis and subsequent 
recession imposed on the budgets of individual states and local governments. 
Federal government response to the crisis has been relatively 
straightforward, compensating at least partially for the loss in the private 
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demand (2009-2013) which occurred during the deleveraging of households 
and businesses. Hence, the growth of public debt created counterweight to 
a record-high private debt and the process of deleveraging. 
 On the other hand, restrictive fiscal policies implemented in the euro 
area, in particular from 2011 to 2013, had rather negative impact on 
economic growth and labour market developments. Fiscal austerity worsened 
recession mostly in Greece and other periphery countries, hence, debt-to-
GDP ratios increased faster.  
 In contrast to the USA, the euro area is not a fiscal union, which 
represents a disadvantage from the view of both economic theory and 
economic reality. The recent crisis, with its consequences for the euro area, 
has revealed the necessity to face this shortage. Mechanisms of solidarity in 
the euro area are not at the level of the American federal fiscal system at all. 
The US system contributes to stabilization of regions hit by asymmetric 
shocks. The centralised budget of the whole European Union is low – 
approximately 1 % of GDP (versus almost 20 % GDP in the USA), which 
means about 2 % of public expenditure in the EU Member States (versus 
more than 50 % of total public expenditure in the USA) – and in case of 
asymmetric shocks in individual countries, it does not work as an automatic 
stabilizer. Although the euro area (more precisely the whole EU) has a kind 
of solidarity mechanism available - the Structural Funds and the Cohesion 
Fund (aimed to promote economic convergence and reduce disparities 
among the Member States), these cannot be considered as sufficient 
compensation, due to their lower volume and medium- or long-term effects, 
which means that they do not work anticyclically (Iša, 2002).    
 According to D'Apice (2016), yearly cross-border flows within the 
USA amounted to 1.5 % of GDP between 1980 and 2005 on average, 
compared to 0.25 % in the EU for 2007 to 2013. For each euro paid by an 
average net contributor (EU Member State), approximately 75 cents return 
through the EU budget, and 25 cents cross a border. Although the US federal 
budget is less redistributive in normal times (around 90 cents per dollar 
returning to the contributing state), in the wake of the global crisis net cross-
border fiscal flows increased strongly, financed by federal borrowing. 
Moreover, the main net beneficiaries of the EU cohesion policy funds are not 
yet members of the euro area, which implies that cross-border flows within 
the euro area are even closer to zero. 
 The euro area tries to solve the absence of fiscal union. According to 
the so-called Five Presidents’ Report15 Completing Europe’s Economic and 
Monetary Union (Juncker, Tusk, Dijsselbloem, Draghi and Schultz, 2015), a 
                                                          
15 President of the European Commission in cooperation with the President of the 
European Council, President of the Eurogroup (eurozone Finance Ministers), President of 
the ECB and the President of the European Parliament.  
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stabilizing function of the euro area should be formed to improve the 
cushioning of asymmetric shocks in future. The European unemployment 
benefit scheme is among the most considered solutions. It could take many 
forms; the main types are reinsurance and genuine schemes (for more detail, 
see Gros, 2016). 
 
Development of selected macroeconomic indicators 
 At the beginning of 2009, the US economy has experienced 
significant decline in real GDP growth exceeding 4 % at the annual level 
(Figure 2). Responsible authorities were obliged to respond and revive the 
expansion of economic cycle as soon as possible. The US economy was able 
to start the expansion relatively quickly, especially when compared with 
other advanced economies. The quarterly growth rates of real GDP in the 
USA averaged 2 % since the end of the recession until the first quarter of 
2016 (FRED, 2016). 
F i g u r e  2 
Year-to-year changes in real GDP in the USA and euro area (%) 
 
Source: FRED (2016). 
 
 In this regard it can be concluded that measures taken by responsible 
US authorities were effective. But after looking at the evolution of GDP in 
more detail manner, some doubts about the policy achievements have to be 
expressed. It is, for example, very unusual to experience quarter-to-quarter 
fall in real GDP during the expansion of business cycle (in first quarters of 
2011 and 2015). That certainly does not suggest sufficiently robust 
expansion when compared with episodes of business cycles in the past.16  
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 The euro area experienced similarly deep recession in 2009 as the 
USA; however, the economy of the European monetary union did not 
recover as quickly as the US economy. In 2012, after two years of economic 
growth, the euro area lost dynamics and recorded the second recession in this 
millennium, although a more modest one compared with the one in 2009. 
The reasons behind such development include weak investments and private 
consumption, due to increased uncertainty, continued fiscal consolidation, 
weaker foreign demand as well as growing unemployment. These two 
recessions can be considered as one crisis period with two bottoms – the first 
caused by the global financial crisis and the second (less deep) one as a result 
of the European debt crisis. 
 One reason for such a slow recovery might be pro-cyclical fiscal 
tightening. That is why the effectiveness of the EU’s fiscal framework17 has 
been questioned recently, whether it is in achieving fiscal stabilization or 
public debt sustainability. In addition, the existing EU’s fiscal rules have not 
been properly applied so far.  
 USA seems to be more successful also in terms of labour market 
developments. The unemployment rate reached more than 10 % in October 
2009, the second highest level since the end of the World War II. Due to the 
higher economic growth as well as more flexible labour market, when 
compared with the euro area, the US economy was able to get 
unemployment back to the levels close to its natural level relatively quickly 
(below 5% in 2016) (Figure 3). 
F i g u r e  3 
Unemployment rate and youth unemployment rate in the USA and euro area (%) 
 
Source: Eurostat (2016). 
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 On the contrary, unemployment rate in the euro area continued to 
grow after exceeding 10 % in the end of 2010, reaching even 12.6 % at the 
beginning of 2013. Currently, unemployment rate is again at the level of 
about 10 %, with one half representing long-term unemployment. However, 
the differences among the individual Member States are rather big – on the 
one hand, Germany and the Czech Republic recorded in the second quarter 
of 2016 the lowest unemployment rate (about 4 %), and Greece, on the other 
hand, the highest one (23 %).  
 Similar trends can be seen in the developments of unemployment 
rates in the active population under 25 years. While since 2010 this indicator 
has fallen from more than 19 % to the current level of about 11 % in the 
USA, the euro area recorded maximum of 25 % at the beginning of 2013, 
followed by stagnation or decrease to currently recorded 21 % unemployed 
in the active population of young people (Figure 3). 
 At first sight, labour market development and job creation may 
indicate effectiveness of the Fed´s actions. However, on closer look it turns 
out that the current revitalization of labour market was the longest one, only 
comparable with the recovery right after the World War II. It suggests that 
the US economy is no longer able to generate new jobs in such a fast pace as 
before. Besides, most of the newly created jobs are low-paid positions in the 
service sector. This fact combined with rising number of part-time work 
contracts diminished opportunities for higher earnings, hence leading to 
higher working poverty and income polarization. 
 The euro area registers double unemployment rate (total as well as in 
the young population) compared with the USA, although also in Europe the 
use of part-time jobs increased. Given the growing share of part-time 
employed, the overall amount of hours worked did not still exceed the level 
reached in 2008 in the euro area. Structural unemployment remains one of 
the key problems in the European labour market, in particular within the 
group of low-skilled people.  
 Both monetary unions the euro area and the USA face risks related to 
indebtedness of the public as well as private sector. Given rather significant 
differences in the field of fiscal policy, attention is further paid to 
government debts.  
 Prior to the recent crisis, the growth of the public debt did not pose 
any significant threat to the US economy and was kept under control. In 
2007 it amounted to about the same level as ten years before. Its rapid 
growth to record levels, even from historical perspective, begun with the 
financial crisis and subsequent recession after 2008. Public debt has risen 
from 62 % of GDP in 2007 to more than 100 % of GDP in 2015 (FRED, 
2016) (Figure 4). It is a result of weaker economic activity and the loss of tax 
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revenues as well as the growth of expenditures to overcome negative effects 
of the financial crisis.   
F i g u r e  4 
Government debt in the USA and euro area (% of GDP)  
 
Source: Eurostat (2016), FRED (2016). 
 
 Government debt of the euro area as a percentage of GDP has also 
increased since 2007 and already in 2009 it exceeded the 1999 level (71 % of 
GDP). In 2015 it slightly decreased for the first time since the beginning of 
the recent crisis, namely to 90.7 % of GDP. This decrease has been possible 
due to a slightly faster economic growth and extremely low interest rates. 
However, it needs to be underlined that in absolute terms the volume of debt 
further increased in 2015. Out of nineteen euro area Member States, five 
registered the government debt above 100 % of GDP (Greece, Italy, 
Portugal, Cyprus, and Belgium) and further nine countries above 60 % of 
GDP defined in the Stability and Growth Pact. 
 
Conclusion 
 Recent macroeconomic performance of the two monetary unions 
resulted also from different reaction of responsible institutions to the 
financial crisis and the Great Recession, whether it was in the field of fiscal 
or monetary policy. In spite of these differences, the USA and the euro area 
face a number of similar risks including deflation, timing of the QE 
programme or the rise of public debt.  
 Programme of QE realized by the Fed has lasted for six years to bring 
results in terms of macroeconomic indicators. Therefore, it is reasonable to 
expect that a similar programme in the euro area realized by the ECB should 
have comparable length and intensity to be effective. In terms of fiscal 
policy, the US fiscal union provided needed spending at the federal level 
which enabled financial compensation for negative effects the debt crisis 
imposed on budgets of individual states, nevertheless leading to increase of 
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for the euro area to establish a new efficient institutional framework for 
stabilisation of asymmetric shocks in order to eliminate shortages resulting 
from the absence of a fiscal union. 
 When comparing economic developments in the USA and in the euro 
area after the Great Recession in terms of macroeconomic indicators as GDP 
growth, the rate of unemployment or inflation, it can be concluded that the 
USA outperformed the euro area in general. However, a closer look at 
structural indicators reveals weaker economic expansion as well as lower 
ability of the US economy to create new jobs with similar pace as during the 
previous expansions. On the other hand, there are still only weak signs of 
recovery in the euro area manifested in economic performance and in the 
labour market development. Since the beginning of the crisis the government 
debt to GDP ratio has increased to historically record levels in both monetary 
unions. In the absence of fiscal consolidation and in the light of future budget 
expenditure challenges (e.g. population ageing), sustainability of public 
finances could be endangered.  
 
Note 
 The paper was elaborated with the support of grant VEGA No. 
2/0070/15 and grant VEGA No. 2/0109/16. 
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